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INTRODUCTION 
A well-dressed salesperson is explaining to a potential customer, 
Bernie, an investment opportunity that will provide high returns with little 
to no risk. All Bernie has to do is deposit a percentage of his salary each 
month into a larger fund that will be invested in the stock markets by 
experts. When Bernie needs money someday, the funds will have grown 
exponentially. Additionally, some of Bernie’s hard-earned money will be 
used to pay out customers who have invested during prior years because 
the investments are not generating a large enough return to pay everyone 
what was promised.  
At first Bernie thinks he is hearing a pitch for a classic Ponzi scheme,1 
but, as it turns out, the salesperson is giving a description of a public 
pension system.2 Scholars have argued that public pensions are similar to 
Ponzi schemes, with the major difference being that the latter are illegal.3 
This criticism may be harsh; after all, pensions are not created with the 
intent to defraud employees out of their hard-earned money with the 
promise of guaranteed investment returns. Public pensions, however, do 
have a “consistent theme of understating liabilities, overstating assets, and 
pushing costs into the future.”4  
For public employees, retirement concerns are mounting in light of the 
nationwide public pension crisis, resulting from mismanaged funds and 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2017, by ALYSSA DEPEW. 
 1. Ponzi Schemes, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM’N, https://www 
.sec.gov/answers/ponzi.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/P947-
3PLX]. A Ponzi scheme is an investment scheme in which the operators attract 
new investors by promising to generate high returns with little to no risk. The 
funds taken from the new investors then are used to pay existing investors, 
disguised as high returns. Id.  
 2. Definitions, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans 
/plan-participant-employee/definitions (last visited Sept. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc 
/7UXG-2EVL]. A traditional pension plan promises the participant a specified monthly 
benefit at retirement. Often, the benefit is based on factors, such as the participant’s 
salary, age, and the number of years she worked for the employer. Id. 
 3. See, e.g., Christopher Carosa, Are Pensions Merely Ponzi Schemes?, 
FIDUCIARY NEWS (Aug. 28, 2014), http://fiduciarynews.com/2014/08/are-pensions-
merely-ponzi-schemes/ [https://perma.cc/E7AP-ENEX]. 
 4. JOE NATION, STAN. INST. FOR ECON. POL’Y RES., PENSION MATH: HOW 
CALIFORNIA’S RETIREMENT SPENDING IS SQUEEZING THE STATE BUDGET 15 (Dec. 
13, 2011), https://www.scribd.com/document/75598848/Pension-Math-How-Califor 
nia-s-Retirement-Spending-is-Squeezing-the-State-Budget [https://perma.cc /3NP8-
LLEG]. 
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empty promises.5 To date, public pensions nationwide are over $900 billion 
short of the amount that governments have promised to their workers in pension 
benefits for a given fiscal year.6 Although pension problems transcend state 
borders, Louisiana’s pension systems are especially underfunded.7 In a 2016 
study, the two largest systems in Louisiana were ranked in the top 25 most 
underfunded systems across the United States.8 
Public-sector employees in Louisiana, particularly teachers, have limited 
retirement plan options when they enter the workforce. Most public employees 
are required to pay into a statewide pension plan,9 the two largest being 
Louisiana State Employees’ Retirement System (“LASERS”) and Teachers’ 
Retirement System of Louisiana (“TRSL”).10 LASERS and TRSL are 
categorized as defined benefit plans, which give the retired employee a fixed 
income, usually calculated as a percentage of the employee’s highest earning 
salary years.11  
                                                                                                             
 5. See JOSHUA D. RAUH, HOOVER INST., HIDDEN DEBT, HIDDEN DEFICITS 
1–2 (Apr. 11, 2016), http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/rauh 
_debtdeficits_36pp_final_digital_v2revised4-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/5C9C-HE6 
Y]. Most state and local governments provide retirement benefits to their employees 
through guaranteed pension programs. The government body contributes taxpayer 
money to public systems to fund these promises. Despite states’ optimistic 
assumptions about future investment returns, assets in the pension systems will be 
insufficient to pay for the pensions of current public employees and retirees and 
eventually will have to be supplemented heavily by additional taxpayer dollars to 
make up the difference. Id. 
 6. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE STATE PENSION FUNDING GAP: 2014, at 1 
(Aug. 24, 2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issuebriefs 
/2016/08/the-state-pension-funding-gap-2014 [https://perma.cc/8EW6-H7KX].  
 7. REBECCA A. SIELMAN, MILLIMAN, 2016 PUBLIC PENSION FUNDING 
STUDY 8–10 (Sept. 2016), http://www.milliman.com/uploadedFiles/insight 
/Periodicals/ppfs/2016-public-pension-funding-study.pdf (analyzing data from 
2014 and 2015 for the 100 largest pension programs in the United States) 
[https://perma.cc/QN9J-VCT2].  
 8. Id. 
 9. Some public employees in Louisiana may choose the Optional Retirement 
Plan (“ORP”) instead of selecting TRSL. ORP is a defined contribution plan 
administered through private carriers. Optional Retirement Plan (ORP), TEACHERS’ 
RET. SYS. OF LA., https://www.trsl.org/main/optional_programs/optional_retirement 
_plan (last visited Sept. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/64G2-VCEW]. 
 10. State Data: Louisiana, PUB. PLANS DATA (2015), http://publicplansdata 
.org/quick-facts/by-state/state/?state=LA [https://perma.cc/4ZG2-MEGM]. 
 11. Choosing a Retirement Plan: Defined Benefit Plan, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/choosing-a-retirement-plan-defined 
-benefit-plan (last updated Oct. 20, 2015) [https://perma.cc/R8KU-5NRX]; 
Retirement Topics – Defined Benefit Plan Benefit Limits, INTERNAL REVENUE 
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Public employees in Louisiana lack the option to pay into Social 
Security, precluding these employees from receiving the additional 
retirement benefits that the federal program provides.12 Although states are 
not required to offer public employees the option to pay into Social 
Security, Louisiana’s state retirement system for public employees must 
provide benefits substantially equivalent to Social Security benefits to 
qualify as an alternative to the federal program.13 
With some of the most underfunded pension systems in the United 
States, Louisiana’s solution to its pension crisis should be a multi-faceted 
approach from four angles. First, any efforts to supplement the current 
framework with Social Security benefits must be considered carefully 
because it is unclear whether public employees participating in Social 
Security are in a more advantageous position at retirement than non-
participants.14 Second, the legislature should enact corrective measures to 
restrain political leaders whose underfunding of current pension programs 
has caused much of the long-term harm.15 Third, public employers must 
modify the current pension structure to mitigate the damage that has been 
                                                                                                             
SERV., https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/plan-participant-employee/retirement-
topics-defined-benefit-plan-benefit-limits (last visited Sept. 22, 2017) [https://perma 
.cc/6UJG-MSX2]. For example, if a person’s highest earning wage was $75,000 for 
the last few years of her career, then the defined benefit payout would be a percentage 
of that amount. Id. 
 12. TASK FORCE ON STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN BUDGET & TAX POL’Y, LA. 
DEP’T. OF REV., LASERS AND TRSL RETIREMENT SYSTEMS OVERVIEW 3 (Aug. 12, 
2016), http://www.revenue.louisiana.gov/Miscellaneous/Budget%20Presentation.ppt 
[https://perma.cc/B8XL-TAC4]; see also MONIQUE MORRISSEY, ECON. POL’Y INST., 
POLICY MEMORANDUM: NEW LOUISIANA RETIREMENT PLAN IS BAD FOR WORKERS 
AND TAXPAYERS 1 (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.epi.org/publication/pm198-louisiana-
retirement-plan-workers-taxpayers/ [https://perma.cc/VN5Z-BRYE]. Social Security 
is funded by contributions that workers make while employed. The funds are used 
to pay current beneficiaries of the Social Security program, including Medicare 
recipients. Funds take the form of Federal Insurance Contributions Act (“FICA”) taxes 
that are withheld from most paychecks. When the worker becomes eligible, she will 
receive Social Security benefits that replace a portion of her previous income. SOCIAL 
SECURITY ADMIN., UNDERSTANDING THE BENEFITS (June 2017), https://www.ssa 
.gov/pubs /EN-05-10024.pdf [https://perma.cc/V58U-5DRH].  
 13. LA. STATE EMPS.’ RET. SYS., COMPACT GUIDE TO LASERS 2 (Apr. 2011) 
(on file with author). Federal law requires public employers to participate in Social 
Security unless they can demonstrate that their alternative plans provide benefits 
comparable to the benefit provided by Social Security. I.R.C. § 3121(b)(7)(F) (2012).  
 14. See discussion infra Part III.C.2. 
 15. T. Leigh Anenson, Reforming Public Pensions, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
1, 35 (2014). 
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done to the system and reduce pension costs.16 Finally, government employers 
must provide incentives and make it easier for government employees to save 
more on their own for retirement. Strengthening the pension system will 
provide economic stability to a state struggling to balance its budget.17 
Additionally, because taxpayers ultimately will be required to fund current 
retirees’ benefits, stabilizing the pension systems will lessen the burden placed 
on taxpayers. Pension directors and lawmakers must be proactive and make 
changes now to provide future stability.  
Part I of this Comment provides background information on Louisiana’s 
current pension system, specifically the role of larger pension programs, such 
as LASERS and TRSL. Part I also includes significant historical changes in 
the Social Security system and Louisiana’s legislative history regarding both 
its state pensions and Social Security. Part II examines the current financial 
state of Louisiana’s two largest pension programs: LASERS and TRSL. Part 
III introduces an empirical strategy to estimate the differences in retirement 
income between individuals affected by their state’s participation in Social 
Security. Part IV proposes reform measures and recommendations for 
Louisiana’s public pensions and addresses barriers to such reform. 
Implementation of these proposals will allow for greater security for 
individuals upon retirement and will ease the burden placed on taxpayers. 
I. UNDERSTANDING RETIREMENT: THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 
AND LOUISIANA STATE PENSION SYSTEMS 
Labor force participants in the United States have several saving 
mechanisms available to aid them in preparing for retirement. First, the 
majority of employees receive Social Security benefits upon retirement.18 
Second, in addition to receiving Social Security, employees may receive a 
traditional pension or 401(k) provided by their individual employer.19 
                                                                                                             
 16. Id. at 48–49. 
 17. See Julia O’Donoghue, Louisiana’s budget crisis: TOPS will loom over 
Legislature’s upcoming session, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 13, 2016, 11:26 AM), 
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/03/legislature_tops_budget_session 
.html [https://perma.cc/2F7W-7FQB]. 
 18. Chris Chen, Who is exempt from paying Social Security taxes?, 
INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 2016), https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/013015 
/who-exempt-paying-social-security-taxes.asp [https://perma.cc/9T8P-RSLQ]. 
 19. Retirees receiving both Social Security and a pension are subject to the 
Windfall Elimination Provision (“WEP”) and the Government Pension Offset 
(“GPO”). In 1983, the WEP was enacted to lower Social Security benefit 
payments to beneficiaries “whose work histories include both Social Security-
covered and noncovered employment, with the noncovered employment also 
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Third, an employee also may elect to set up commonly used Individual 
Retirement Arrangements (“IRAs”).20 This section provides a synopsis of the 
current programs available to retirees in Louisiana.  
A. The Social Security Act 
When Congress passed the Social Security Act (“Act”) in 1935,21 public 
employees were not eligible for Social Security benefits,22 primarily because 
“there were concerns that imposing a Social Security tax on state and local 
government employees might be unconstitutional.”23 In addition to 
government employees, about half the workers in the American economy 
were excluded from coverage.24 
Beginning in 1951, § 218 of the Act allowed states to “opt in” to Social 
Security coverage for public employees who were not already covered under 
                                                                                                             
providing pension coverage.” Alan L. Gustman, Thomas L. Steinmeier & Nahid 
Tabatabai, The Social Security Windfall Elimination and Government Pension 
Offset Provisions for Public Employees in the Health and Retirement Study, 74 
SOCIAL SECURITY BULL. 55, 55 (2014), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb 
/v74n3/v74n3p55.html [https://perma.cc/M3FM-PPXB]. The GPO reduces the 
Social Security benefits, including a spouse’s survivor benefits, of an individual 
who also is entitled to a government pension based on non-covered employment. 
42 U.S.C. § 402(k)(5)(A) (2012); 20 C.F.R. § 404.408a(a) (2016). Both provisions 
were enacted to prevent “double-dipping.” Gustman, Steinmeier & Tabatabai, 
supra.  
 20. Traditional and Roth IRAs, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Aug. 12, 2017), 
https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/traditional-and-roth-iras [https://perma.cc/M 
J4Z-TSCX]. 
 21. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620. The purpose 
of the Social Security Act was  
[t]o provide for the general welfare by establishing a system of Federal 
old-age benefits, and by enabling the several States to make more 
adequate provision for aged persons, blind persons, dependent and 
crippled children, maternal and child welfare, public health, and the 
administration of their unemployment compensation laws; to establish a 
Social Security Board; to raise revenue; and for other purposes. 
Id. 
 22. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd. v. Shalala, 153 F.3d 1160, 1161 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 23. Id. 
 24. The Decision to Exclude Agricultural and Domestic Workers from the 1935 
Social Security Act, 70 SOCIAL SECURITY BULL. 49, 49 (2010), https://www.ssa.gov 
/policy/docs/ssb/v70n4/v70n4p49.html [https://perma.cc/YKR2-7RQ5]. 
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a retirement plan.25 This “opt-in” is referred to as a “Section 218 Agreement” 
and is entered into with the Social Security Administration.26 Once a coverage 
group enters and is provided coverage through such an agreement, the contract 
cannot be terminated.27 On July 2, 1991, Social Security participation became 
mandatory for state employees who were not members of a public retirement 
system.28 To date, Louisiana is one of 15 states in which teachers have not 
opted into Social Security by way of Section 218 Agreements.29 
For public employers to remain opted out of providing Social Security 
benefits to their employees, the state must offer a retirement program that 
qualifies as an alternative to Social Security by providing retirement benefits 
“substantially equivalent” to the retirement portion of Social Security.”30 
Federal law primarily governs Social Security decisions and permits Louisiana 
to implement such a scheme under § 218 of the Social Security Act.31 Louisiana 
entered into a Section 218 Agreement with the Social Security Administration 
in 1952 but only for certain state and local government employees.32 According 
to § 218, states can amend their agreements to extend Social Security coverage 
to any employees to whom the agreements did not apply previously, 
                                                                                                             
 25. 42 U.S.C. § 418(d)(5)(A) (2012) (showing that although most public 
employees were allowed to opt in, the 1954 amendment still excluded police 
officers and firefighters from Social Security).  
 26. Social Security, LA. DEPT. OF THE TREAS., https://www.treasury.state 
.la.us/Home%20Pages/SocialSecurity.aspx (last visited Sept. 22, 2017) [https://per 
ma.cc/JBY5-SDBP]. 
 27. See § 418(f); see also Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. 
Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1981). 
 28. Program Operations Manual System: RS 01505.001 Introduction to 
Section 218 and State and Local Coverage, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Nov. 19, 2009), 
http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0301505001 [https://perma.cc/SRS4-REC4]. 
 29. Social Security Offsets: Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, 
http://www.nea.org/home/16819.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/U 
W2V-R697]. Other states include Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, 
Kentucky, Texas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, and Ohio. Id. 
 30. Mallory Chatelain, Same-Sex Marriages Are Not Created Equal: United 
States v. Windsor and Its Legal Aftermath in Louisiana, 75 LA. L. REV. 303, 306 
(2014); see also COMPACT GUIDE TO LASERS, supra note 13, at 2; 26 C.F.R. § 
31.3121(b)(7)–2 (2000). 
 31. § 418; Program Operations Manual System SL 20001.210: Determinations 
Regarding Section 218 Agreements, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Dec. 11, 2003), http://policy 
.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/1920001210 [https://perma.cc/AY79-TJAJ]. 
 32. See Social Security, supra note 26.  
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regardless of whether these employees were previously members of a 
public retirement system, such as LASERS.33 
B. Louisiana’s Public Pension Systems 
Louisiana has 19 pension programs for public employees34—the two 
largest of which are LASERS and TRSL. Established in 1946, LASERS 
has a mandatory membership requirement for most Louisiana state 
employees.35 Additionally, because LASERS previously qualified as a 
substitute to the Social Security program, members of LASERS are not 
eligible to receive Social Security benefits.36 
TRSL was founded in 1936 and is Louisiana’s largest public retirement 
system, providing services and benefits to more than 160,000 individuals.37 
TRSL is qualified under the Internal Revenue Code as a public trust fund,38 
which is meant to provide retirement benefits for its members.39 All 
teachers in Louisiana must become members of this system as a condition 
of their employment.40  
Both LASERS and TRSL are categorized as defined benefit plans, as 
opposed to defined contribution plans. A distinguishing characteristic of a 
defined benefit plan is that the employer bears the risk and responsibility 
“to make sufficient contributions to the plan to insure that the benefits the 
                                                                                                             
 33. § 418(a)(1), (c)(4). “The Commissioner of Social Security shall, at the request 
of any State, enter into an agreement with such State for the purpose of extending the 
insurance system established by this subchapter to services performed by individuals 
as employees of such State or any political subdivision thereof.” § 418(a)(1). 
 34. Member Systems, LA. ASS’N OF PUB. EMPLOYEES’ RET. SYS., http://www 
.lapers.org/MemberSystems.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc 
/Y5XU-7H5F]. 
 35. COMPACT GUIDE TO LASERS, supra note 13, at 2; Introduction to Section 
218: State and Local Coverage, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. Slide 16 (2008), www.ssa.gov 
/section218training/documents/Resource_3.ppt [https://perma.cc/WN9B-59DS]. 
 36. COMPACT GUIDE TO LASERS, supra note 13, at 2; Social Security 
Impact, LA. STATE EMPLOYEES’ RET. SYS., https://lasersonline.org/resources 
/legislative-issues/2017-regular-session-frequently-asked-questions/ (last visited 
Sept. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/F52L-F8MM]. 
 37. About TRSL, TEACHERS’ RET. SYS. OF LA., https://www.trsl.org/main 
/about_trsl (last visited Sept. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/X3NW-NMUY]. 
 38. Also known as a “charitable trust,” a public trust fund is a fund of money 
whose principal and interest monies are available for the benefit of the general 
public rather than a private individual or entity. Public Trust Fund, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 39. About TRSL, supra note 37. 
 40. LA. REV. STAT. § 11:721 (2017). 
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employee is entitled to receive . . . at retirement will be paid.”41 Further, 
under defined benefit plans, a qualified plan trustee makes the investment 
decisions.42  
Contrary to defined benefit, under a defined contribution plan, the 
employee is not entitled to a particular payout at retirement.43 The amount 
of benefits that the employee will receive at retirement is based upon the 
amount of contributions the employer and employee make to the plan and the 
interest earned on those contributions.44 The burden is on the employee—not 
the employer—to direct his investments in certain mutual funds.45 
Most public pensions are run by a board of trustees—TRSL and LASERS 
are no exception. A 13-member Board of Trustees administers LASERS 
operations.46 Louisiana law permits the board to adopt rules and regulations 
in administering LASERS programs and benefits.47 Similarly, the TRSL 
Board of Trustees is made up of 12 elected members and 5 ex officio members 
and is responsible for safeguarding and managing the assets held in trust to 
provide retirement income for system members.48 
Together, TRSL and LASERS have approximately 260,000 members49 
and account for over 70% of public retirement members.50 Because these 
two systems are so large, their fiscal decisions have a significant impact not 
only on a large portion of public employees and retirees but also on the 
state economy as a whole.51  
                                                                                                             
 41. DENNIS R. LASSILA & BOB G. KILPATRICK, EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION 
AND BENEFITS TAX GUIDE ¶ 502.2 (2016); see also Edward A. Zelinsky, The 
Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 453 (2004). 
 42. LASSILA & KILPATRICK, supra note 41.  
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. at 9. 
 45. Id. at 10. 
 46. Board of Trustees, LA. STATE EMPS’ RET. SYS., https://lasersonline 
.org/about/board-of-trustees/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/SQ6E-
2R7J]. 
 47. Id.; see also LA. REV. STAT. § 11:515(2).  
 48. TRSL Board of Trustees, TEACHERS’ RET. SYS. OF LA., https://www.trsl 
.org/main/about_trsl/board_of_trustees (last visited Sept. 22, 2017) [https://per 
ma.cc/TKP8-5WHG]. 
 49. About TRSL, supra note 37; About LASERS, LA. STATE EMPS. RET. SYS., 
http://www.lasersonline.org/about (last visited Sept. 22, 2017) [https://perma 
.cc/M8QQ-PUHZ]. 
 50. Member Systems, supra note 34. 
 51. COMPACT GUIDE TO LASERS, supra note 13, at 5, 17. Because “[o]ver 
90% of LASERS retirees live in Louisiana,” the retirement system’s economic 
impact amounts to $782 million. Id. Additionally, “LASERS invests over $230 
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II. THE DIRE FINANCIAL STATE OF LOUISIANA’S TWO LARGEST PENSION 
PROGRAMS: LASERS AND TRSL 
The Louisiana Legislature consolidated public retirement law in the 
Louisiana Revised Statutes to comply with the requirement in the 
Louisiana Constitution “to maintain public retirement systems on a sound 
actuarial basis.”52 Despite this effort by the legislature, Louisiana’s largest 
pension systems still are severely underfunded compared to other 
comparable programs.53 The LASERS actuarial report, published on June 
30, 2016, declared that its pension program has over $6.9 billion in 
unfunded actuarial accrued liability (“UAAL”).54 Similarly, TRSL had 
more than $11 billion in UAAL for the 2015 fiscal year.55 In its basic form, 
UAAL is the difference between the amount in benefits that a pension has 
committed to pay in the future and the total amount of assets currently on 
hand.56  
Determining whether a pension plan has become underfunded is based 
on the actuarial valuation of that plan. The Louisiana Constitution requires 
“that the legislature establish for each state or statewide public retirement 
system[] a particular method of actuarial valuation . . . .”57 For both 
LASERS and TRSL, the “‘funded percentage’ for each state public 
retirement system” is the amount of assets available divided by the liability 
of the system for future payouts.58  
                                                                                                             
million in Louisiana companies.” Id. LASERS is a “major economic driver” for 
the state of Louisiana. Id.  
 52. LA. REV. STAT. § 11:2. 
 53. See SIELMAN, supra note 7.  
 54. Summary of Valuation Results: LASERS Actuarial Valuation, FOSTER & 
FOSTER ACTUARIES AND CONSULTANTS (June 30, 2016), http://lasersonline.org 
/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/ValuationSummarySheet-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/B 
NP7-FWGA]. 
 55. TEACHERS RET. SYS. OF LA., 2015 COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL 
REPORT 110 (2015), https://www.trsl.org/uploads/File/Annual%20Reports/CA 
FR/2015_CAFR_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/X494-W5BM] [hereinafter TRSL 
ANNUAL REPORT]. 
 56. See Anna K. Selby, Pensions In A Pinch: Why Texas Should Reconsider 
Its Policies On Public Retirement Benefit Protection, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1211, 
1216 (2011). 
 57. LA. CONST. art. X, § 29(E)(1); see also LA. REV. STAT. § 11:21.  
 58. LA. REV. STAT. § 11:23. For both LASERS and TRSL, the “funded 
percentage for each state public retirement system shall mean the valuation assets 
used to determine the actuarially required contributions pursuant to [Louisiana 
Revised Statutes §] 11:102 divided by the accrued liability of the system 
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The presence of unfunded accrued liabilities in the actuarial equation 
is not in and of itself problematic with the constitutional requirement that 
the public retirement systems maintain actuarial soundness.59 The unfunded 
accrued liability is just one factor “in the multi-level formula for determining 
actuarial soundness of the system.”60 To evaluate the strength of a pension 
program, industry-leading financial researchers measure the percentage of 
total commitments a pension has made that are funded.61 Researchers assign 
a “below average” rating for pensions that are 60% to 80% funded and a 
“weak” rating for pensions that are funded below 60%.62 With LASERS and 
TRSL funded at 62.75% and 62.5% in 2016, respectively, these two large 
systems are approaching the weakest financial rating available for public 
pension programs.63 If Louisiana faces a financial crisis and is forced to make 
cuts to expenditures and pension benefits, then devastating financial 
consequences could impact the stability of public employees’ pensions.  
The exorbitant amount of UAAL, combined with low actuarial ratings, 
clearly indicates that there is insufficient revenue and over-spending—or, 
more likely, a combination of both—plaguing Louisiana’s largest pension 
systems.64 This underfunding causes instability for Louisiana’s economy, 
particularly because the law, regardless of the availability of funds, 
                                                                                                             
determined by utilizing the funding method established in [Louisiana Revised 
Statutes §] 11:22.” Id.  
 59. Following accounting standards for state and local government -
sponsored pension plans, the term “actuarial soundness” references plans that 
have a logical pattern of funding that is anticipated to accumulate sufficient assets 
to make pension payments when they come due—a period that can extend many 
years into the future and even after an employee stops working. AM. ACAD. OF 
ACTUARIES, ACTUARIAL SOUNDNESS 13 (2012), http://www.actuary.org/files 
/publications/Actuarial%20Soundness%20Special%20Report%20FINAL%205  
%2010%2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/LNV2-BL6P]. 
 60. La. Mun. Ass’n v. State, 893 So. 2d 809, 855 (La. 2005). 
 61. STANDARD & POOR’S, U.S. STATE RATINGS METHODOLOGY 19 (Jan. 3, 
2011), http://www.nasra.org/Files/Topical%20Reports/Credit%20Effects/StateRat 
ingsMethodology.pdf [https://perma.cc/KS77-8DN5]. 
 62. Id. Standard and Poor’s Global Ratings provide high-quality market 
intelligence in the form of credit ratings, research, and thought leadership. Id.  
 63. SIELMAN, supra note 7. 
 64. Over-spending could include the state borrowing from pension funds to 
pay other debts, giving benefit increases to members, or making COLAs. See 
generally Jack M. Beermann, The Public Pension Crisis, 70 WASH & LEE L. REV. 
3, 34 (2013). For more information on COLAs, see infra note 121. 
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guarantees pension benefits.65 Further negative consequences of an 
insolvent pension system include the inability to pay future commitments, 
workers not being paid for retirement, and taxpayers bearing the burden to 
fulfill the promised funding.66 
III. SOCIAL SECURITY PERKS: ARE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES IN LOUISIANA 
MISSING OUT? 
Although public-sector employees in Louisiana have not opted into 
the Social Security program for the last 60 years, this delay does not 
prevent particular groups of employees67 from opting in at any point in the 
future.68 Some scholars argue that Social Security benefits could provide 
a “safety net” to public employees by preventing gaps in coverage.69 This 
part provides the steps that Louisiana could take to opt-in to Social 
Security, the expected consequences, and an empirical analysis of the 
impact that the lack of Social Security has had on both Louisiana’s public 
school teachers and public school teachers nationwide.70 This study is the 
first in Louisiana to evaluate the long-term effects of the decision made 
over the last several decades to abscond from Social Security benefits for 
public employees. 
A. How Could Louisiana “Opt-in” to Social Security, and What Would 
the Consequences Be? 
Louisiana could form an agreement with the Social Security 
Administration if the governor of Louisiana certified to the Commissioner 
                                                                                                             
 65. “The accrued benefits of members of any state or statewide public retirement 
system shall not be diminished or impaired.” LA. CONST. art. X, § 29(E)(5). The 
promised pension benefits have to be paid regardless of the availability of funds. Id.  
 66. Hannah Heck, Solving Insolvent Public Pensions: The Limitations Of The 
Current Bankruptcy Option, 28 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 89, 89–90 (2011).  
 67. For example, an entire school district could vote by referendum to opt in 
to Social Security by following the steps laid out in Part III.A. of this Comment. 
 68. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 69. Anenson, supra note 15, at 57; see also DAWN NUSCHLER ET AL., CONG. 
RES. SERVICE, R41936, SOCIAL SECURITY: MANDATORY COVERAGE OF NEW 
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 3 (July 25, 2011), http://www.nasra 
.org/Files/Topical%20Reports/Social%20Security/CRS%202011%20Report.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/HR6A-FEXG]. 
 70. Public school teachers make up a large portion of public pension 
employees in Louisiana and therefore provide a significant test group for this 
empirical study. TRSL ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 55, at 37. 
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of Social Security that the following five conditions have been met.71 First, a 
referendum by secret written ballot must be held to consider whether the 
particular pension group in question should be covered under a Section 218 
Agreement.72 Second, the opportunity to vote in the referendum can be 
given only to eligible employees.73 Third, all employees who are eligible 
to vote must receive at least 90 days’ notice of the referendum.74 Fourth, 
the referendum should be directed under the supervision of the governor 
or an entity designated by him.75 Lastly, a majority of the eligible 
employees must participate in the vote for the decision to be effective.76 
There are several immediate consequences that would result from 
Louisiana’s public employees entering a Section 218 Agreement. These 
consequences are evidenced in the increased contributions from teachers’ 
annual salaries. If an agreement opting into Social Security were executed, 
teachers would be required to contribute an additional 6.2% of the first 
$118,500 of their annual salaries to federal income tax.77 Adding this 
amount to pension contributions already made by teachers would cause 
teachers’ total contributions to rise to nearly 15%.78 Further, the school 
districts, which under a non-Social Security framework pay nothing into 
Social Security, would have to match employee contributions with an 
additional 6.2% in payroll tax.79 These immediate effects would put a large 
strain on both school systems and individual teachers, particularly after 
recent years of budget cuts.80 
                                                                                                             
 71. 42 U.S.C. § 418(d)(3) (2012). The governor also could designate another 
official to certify that the conditions have been met. Id.  
 72. § 418(d)(3)(A). 
 73. § 418(d)(3)(B). An employee is deemed an “eligible employee” for 
purposes of a referendum if, at the time the referendum was held, the employee 
was in a position covered by the retirement system and was a member of such 
system. § 418(d)(3)(E). The exception to this definition includes an employee 
whose position to which the state agreement does not apply and is covered by a 
different retirement system. § 418(d)(5)(B).  
 74. § 418(d)(3)(C). 
 75. § 418(d)(3)(D). 
 76. § 418(d)(3)(E).  
 77. JUDITH S. LOHMAN, OLR RESEARCH REPORT: TEACHERS AND SOCIAL 
SECURITY (2006), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2006/rpt/2006-R-0547.htm (analyzing 
the direct consequences if teachers in Connecticut were to opt into Social Security) 
[https://perma.cc/6FBA-EXYN]. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. 
 80. See Julia O’Donoghue, Latest Louisiana Budget Cuts K-12 Funding, Protects 
Higher Ed, TIMES-PICAYUNE (June 22, 2016, 5:41 PM), http://www.nola.com 
/politics/index.ssf/2016/06/budget_public_schools_cut.html [https://per  
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In addition to the short-term financial stress that this option would put 
on public employers and employees, Social Security may not actually 
provide any long-term stability for new members. Demands on the Social 
Security Administration have reached all-time highs in recent years as a 
result of the “baby boom generation” reaching its peak years for 
retirement.81 The negative financial outlook attached to the Social Security 
program is further emphasized by the 2016 Trustees Report on Social 
Security’s Financial Outlook,82 which reported that the program faces 
critical deficits.83 Because the Social Security program is so strained, it 
likely would not provide enough future benefit to Louisiana state 
employees to make opting in worthwhile.84 
                                                                                                             
ma.cc/7SMH-FU7Q]. See generally Joseph Rallo, Letters: Cuts to Higher 
Education Harming the Future of Louisiana, ADVOCATE (July 7, 2016, 3:15 AM), 
http://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/opinion/letters/article_064d2bea-43ac-
1 1 e 6 -a b f1 -e 3 2 4 6 d 5 fd b 6 c . h t ml  [ h t t p s : / / p e r ma . c c / 4 R 5 S -E F 3 A] . 
 81. KATHLEEN ROMIG, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES, SOCIAL 
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION CUTS HURT EVERY STATE 1 (Sept. 12, 2016), http://www 
.cbpp.org/research/social-security/social-security-administration-cuts-hurt-every- 
state [https://perma.cc/K42B-AAJ4]. 
 82. The Trustees of the Social Security and Medicare trust funds publish an 
annual report on the current and projected financial status of the two programs. Both 
programs face long-term financing shortfalls under the current scheduled benefits 
and funding, and lawmakers have a broad range of policies that, if implemented, 
could reduce the deficiencies of both programs. The Trustees’ Report recommends 
the urgency with which lawmakers should address these shortfalls and implement 
timely solutions. This recommendation is important because early action by elected 
officials can minimize negative impacts on vulnerable populations, including lower-
income workers, and people already dependent on program benefits. Status of the 
Social Security and Medicare Programs, SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN. (Jan. 18, 2017), 
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/trsum/ [https://perma.cc/4NXL-DG9H]. 
 83. ALICA H. MUNNELL, CTR. FOR RET. RES. AT B.C., SOCIAL SECURITY’S 
FINANCIAL OUTLOOK: THE 2016 UPDATE IN PERSPECTIVE 1 (June 2016), 
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/IB_16-10.pdf (stating a 75 year 
deficit of 2.66% of taxable payrolls) [https://perma.cc/X5V4-26T9]. 
 84. Social Security’s main program, Old-age and Survivors Insurance 
(“OASI”), is projected to reach insolvency in 2035. The program  
is expected to have only enough revenue from payroll taxes, interest on 
the Trust Fund balance, and repayment of borrowed Trust Fund dollars 
to pay out scheduled benefits until 2035 . . . If no action is taken to 
improve Social Security’s solvency before its Trust Fund runs dry, 
benefits will either be delayed or reduced across the board by 23 percent.  
ROMINA BOCCIA, HERITAGE FOUND., SOCIAL SECURITY: $39 BILLION DEFICIT IN 
2014, INSOLVENT BY 2035, at 22 (July 29, 2015), http://www.heritage.org/research 
/reports/2015/07/social-security-39-billion-deficit-in-2014-insolvent-by-2035  
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Further, providing Social Security as an option for public employees 
could have a negative impact on Louisiana’s current pension programs. 
For example, if Louisiana implemented a scheme to make LASERS 
optional rather than mandatory for all state employees, the state may face 
substantial consolidation concerns. Specifically, allowing Louisiana’s 
employees to have the option between LASERS and Social Security would 
pose a threat to its viability as an independent retirement system because 
it would not be able to attract new members at the same rate as it had 
previously.85 Although new employees still may choose to join LASERS, 
many others may choose to go with Social Security, thus diminishing the 
pool of participants who would be paying into LASERS.  
If the number of participants in LASERS starts to diminish, this could 
prompt lawmakers to consolidate LASERS with other state retirement 
plans to create a larger public pension system.86 Therefore, though it may 
be in the best interest of an individual LASERS member to supplement 
with or switch over to Social Security, it would weaken LASERS severely 
as a whole if the program starts losing participants faster than they can be 
replaced. Because LASERS is a “major economic driver” for the state,87 
Louisiana has a considerable public interest in protecting LASERS by 
declining proposals that would encourage LASERS members to participate in 
other benefit plans, such as Social Security.88 
Further, teachers in Louisiana, who make up the largest public pension 
group in the state, are relatively better off at retirement than their counterparts 
in states who are paying into Social Security.89 The following section 
introduces an empirical strategy to estimate the difference in retirement 
income between individuals who reside in states that have entered into a 
Section 218 Agreement, compared to those individuals who do not. This 
comparison attempts to isolate the financial consequences of paying into 
Social Security.  
                                                                                                             
[https://perma.cc/XS4D-XUXJ]. 
 85. COMPACT GUIDE TO LASERS, supra note 13, at 6, 7. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 5, 17. Because “[o]ver 90% of LASERS retirees live in Louisiana,” 
the retirement system’s economic impact amounts to $782 million. Additionally, 
“LASERS invests over $230 million in Louisiana companies.” Id. 
 88. Id. at 17.  
 89. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
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B. Empirical Strategy and Data Analysis 
This empirical strategy uses data from the American Community 
Survey (“ACS”), which was collected from 2009 to 2014.90 The ACS is a 
nationally representative survey conducted by the United States Census 
Bureau.91 It is the largest administered survey in the United States and is 
sent to approximately 3.5 million individuals each year.92 The ACS is a 
commonly used data source and is conducted to facilitate economic 
research in the United States.93 It provides a wide array of information for 
each person surveyed, including demographic characteristics and income 
measures.94  
1. An Introduction to the Difference-in-Difference Framework 
The empirical strategy used in this study employs a difference-in-
difference estimation framework that has become widely popular in 
economic and legal research.95 The difference-in-difference estimation 
strategy isolates the difference between the outcomes of two groups from 
simultaneous effects that may influence the same outcome.96 Particularly, 
                                                                                                             
 90. Steven Ruggles et al., Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 
6.0, MINNEAPOLIS: UNIV. OF MINN. (2015), http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0 
[https://perma.cc/A7N2-5GFF]. 
 91. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY INFORMATION 
GUIDE 1 (Apr. 2013), https://www.census.gov/acs/www/about/acs-information-
guide/flipbook/files/inc/d6425564bc.pdf [https://perma.cc/YQH6-7LPY]. 
 92. Id. at 8, 13. 
 93. American Community Survey (ACS), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Jan. 18, 2017), 
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/about.html [https://perma .cc/9MW6-
J239]. In addition to facilitating academic research, the ACS provides a wealth of data 
that is relied on by government agencies to make important decisions about the 
distribution of nearly $400 billion in federal funds each year. REGINA POWERS, DAVID 
BEEDE & RUDY TELLES, JR., ECONS. AND STATS. ADMIN., THE VALUE OF THE 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY: SMART GOVERNMENT, COMPETITIVE BUSINESS, 
AND INFORMED CITIZENS 1 (Apr. 2015), http://www.esa.gov/sites/default/files/the-
value-of-the-acs.pdf [https://perma.cc /62RF-EGCF]. 
 94. American Community Survey (ACS), supra note 93.  
 95. See David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Poisoning the Next Apple? The 
America Invents Act and Individual Inventors, 65 STAN. L. REV. 517, 521 (Mar. 
2013) (citing JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A 
MODERN APPROACH 450–54 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing the use and implementation 
of the difference-in-difference approach in analyzing policy)); see also David S. 
Abrams, Did TRIPS Spur Innovation? An Analysis of Patent Duration and 
Incentives to Innovate, 157 U. OF PENN. L. REV. 1613, 1619 (2009). 
 96. See supra note 95.  
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the average annual retirement income of teachers in a state without a 
Section 218 Agreement—a non-Section 218 state—is compared to the 
average annual retirement income of retired teachers in a state with a 
Section 218 Agreement—a Section 218 state. This analysis focuses on 
public employees who are teachers because they comprise the largest 
pension group in Louisiana.97  
Any difference observed in the average annual retirement income of 
these two groups could be the result of retired teachers in non-Section 218 
states not receiving Social Security income. The difference, however, 
could instead be the result of fundamental differences between states that 
chose to enter or not enter a Section 218 Agreement. Specifically, any 
difference in annual retirement income of retired teachers between 
Louisiana and Alabama may be caused by other economic factors and not 
the state’s decision to enter a Section 218 Agreement.  
To avoid this dual effect, the average annual income of retired non-
teachers in a non-Section 218 state is compared to the average annual 
income of retired non-teachers in a Section 218 state.98 These non-teachers 
likely worked in private sector jobs and, therefore, are not affected by their 
state’s Section 218 Agreement status. Therefore, the difference in their 
average annual retirement incomes represents the general difference 
between non-Section 218 and Section 218 states. The dissimilarities across 
the two types of states could be caused by contemporaneous factors, such 
as state-specific economics, rather than the state’s decision to enter a 
Section 218 Agreement.  
The difference in means between the retired teachers across the two 
types of states then is compared to the difference in means from the retired 
non-teachers across the two types of states.99 The difference in these 
                                                                                                             
 97. The ACS data provides information indicating an individual’s undergraduate 
degree. The individuals used for this analysis all have an undergraduate education 
degree. Although some may not be using their education degree to teach, the 
assumption made for this study is that those with an education degree are likely 
employed as teachers.  American Community Survey (ACS), supra note 93. 
 98. Giorgo Sertsios, Bonding Through Investments: Evidence from Franchising, 
31 J. OF LAW, ECON. & ORG. 187, 200 (2015) (using a difference-in-difference 
approach to analyze the impact of good-cause laws on investment requirements). “A 
key assumption in a difference-in-difference estimation is that the variation in the 
variable of interest attributed to the treatment[—that is, not having a Section 218 
agreement—]is not a mere consequence of prior trends.” Id.  
 99. In its basic function, the difference-in-difference approach “contains a 
treatment sample and a control sample.” Mark Humphery-Jenner, Strong 
Financial Laws Without Strong Enforcement: Is Good Law Always Better than 
No Law?, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 288, 299 (2013). “The treatment sample 
is exposed to the treatment in the second period but not in the first, [and] [t]he 
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amounts is known as a difference-in-difference estimate.100 This estimate 
represents the additional annual retirement income that retired teachers 
have in non-Section 218 states, relative to Section 218 states, after 
conditioning out contemporaneous effects caused by systematic 
differences between the two types of states. 
C. Application of the Difference-in-Difference Estimation Strategy  
The difference-in-difference estimation strategy is applied through 
two levels of analysis, which helps postulate the most robust results.101 The 
first level provides a direct comparison between Louisiana and Alabama—
two states similar in median income, labor force participation, geography, 
and demographics.102 The second level of analysis increases the number 
of observations used by comparing all non-Section 218 states to all Section 
218 states. 
1. Louisiana vs. Alabama 
The first level of analysis applies the difference-in-difference 
estimation strategy to compare the retirement income of Louisiana 
residents, who are ostensibly affected by their state’s choice not to enter 
into a Section 218 Agreement, with similar individuals in Alabama, who 
                                                                                                             
control sample is never exposed to the treatment.” Id. In the study at hand, the 
difference-in-difference model uses the control sample to adjust for changes in 
retirement income that are not related to outside factors.  
 100. J. D. ANGRIST & J. S. PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS: AN 
EMPIRICIST’S COMPANION 227–43 (2008). The difference-in-difference technique 
is “a statistical technique used in econometrics and quantitative research in the 
social sciences that attempts to mimic an experimental research design using 
observational study data, by studying the differential effect of a treatment on a 
‘treatment group’ versus a ‘control group’ in a natural experiment.” Id.  
 101. See Michael Lechner, The Estimation of Causal Effects by Difference-in-
Difference Methods, 4 FOUNDS. AND TRENDS IN ECONOMETRICS 165, 168 (2011). 
As Lechner explains, 
The basic idea of this identification strategy is that if the two treated and 
the two nontreated groups are subject to the same time trends, and if the 
treatment has had no effect in the pre-treatment period, then an estimate 
of the “effect” of the treatment in a period in which it is known to have 
none, can be used to remove the effect of confounding factors to which 
a comparison of post-treatment outcomes of treated and nontreated may 
be subject to. 
Id. 
 102. See discussion infra Part III.C.1. 
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have received Social Security income because of their state’s decision to 
enter into a Section 218 Agreement. Alabama is a natural control state for 
Louisiana because both states are in the southern region of the United 
States and have similar observable characteristics. For example, the 
median income of employed individuals in Louisiana is $34,000, and the 
median income for comparable individuals in Alabama is $32,000.103 
Further, these two states have similar labor force participation rates: 57.1% 
in Louisiana and 54.4% in Alabama.104 Likewise, the level of education 
attained is similar in both states. In Louisiana, 84.6% of individuals ages 
24 and older have a high school degree, and in Alabama, 85.3% of 
individuals ages 24 and older have a high school degree.105  
Table 1 shows the mean retirement income for individuals 67 and over 
who are no longer participating in the labor force.106 The income measures 
were adjusted for inflation by being converted into 2014 dollars using the 
Consumer Price Index (“CPI”).107 The first column reports the mean and 
standard deviation of retirement income for retirees in Louisiana and 
Alabama who have a teaching degree. As displayed in the table, retired 
teachers in Louisiana have $394.76 less in annual retirement income than 
teachers in Alabama.108  
                                                                                                             
 103. Statistics from 2009-2014 ACS data. AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 
INFORMATION GUIDE, supra note 91, at 8 (calculations on file with author). See 
supra Part III.B.1. for an explanation of these calculations. 
 104. AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY INFORMATION GUIDE, supra note 91, at 8. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See infra Table 1. 
 107. Consumer Price Index 1913-, FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, 
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/community/teaching-aids/cpi-calculator-informa 
tion/consumer-price-index-and-inflation-rates-1913 (last visited Sept. 22, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/XU89-5CF8]. The CPI is a measure of the average change in 
prices over time in a market basket of goods and services. The Bureau of Labor 
Statistics releases CPI data monthly. Consumer Price Index, BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATS., https://www.bls.gov/cpi/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2017) [https://perma 
.cc/3NBS-2DMN]. 
 108. See infra Table 1. 
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Table 1: Louisiana and Alabama Mean Annual Retirement 
Income and Difference-in-Difference Estimates 
 School Teachers Non-School Teachers 
Louisiana 17113.38 15776.48 
 (20276.18) (24743.43) 
Number of Observations 1,697 2,758 
   
Alabama 17508.14 22230.66 
 (21734.36) (31110.56) 
Number of Observations 1,747 3,613 
   
Difference in Louisiana and 
Alabama 
-394.76 -6454.18*** 
 [-0.55] [-8.95] 
   
Difference-in-Difference 6059.42*** 
 [5.46] 
Data comes from the 2014 American Community Survey. Standard deviations are 
reported in parentheses. Test statistics (t-stats) from difference in means tests are reported 
in square brackets. * 0.10, ** 0.05 and *** 0.01 denote significance levels from the 
difference in means tests. 
 
The initial comparison demonstrated in the first column of Table 1 
does not reveal whether the lower retirement income of Louisiana teachers 
is caused by Louisiana teachers not participating in Social Security through 
a Section 218 Agreement or if retired individuals in Louisiana generally 
have a lower retirement income relative to retired individuals in Alabama. 
To account for general differences in retirement income between the two 
states, the mean retirement income of non-teachers109 is reported in the 
second column of Table 1.110 As displayed, individuals in Louisiana have a 
retirement income that, on average, is $6,454.18 lower than individuals in 
                                                                                                             
 109. It may be the case that teachers who have not filed Section 218 
agreements receive Social Security income through other jobs they have 
participated in that were not teaching jobs in Louisiana. Similarly, individuals 
who are non-teachers may not receive Social Security income due to unknown 
variables. 
 110. See supra Table 1. 
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Alabama. The difference-in-difference estimate is calculated by subtracting 
the difference in retirement income of non-teachers between the two states 
from the difference in retirement income of teachers between the two 
states.  
The difference-in-difference estimate suggests that retired Louisiana 
teachers have $6,059.42 more in retirement income because they have not 
opted into Social Security.111 The disparity of non-teacher salaries across 
Louisiana and Alabama suggests that Louisiana teachers may have been 
at a disadvantage if they had opted into Social Security. In the next 
subsection, this study is followed up by a more robust study of retirement 
income in the two types of states.  
2. Teachers in Non-Section 218 States vs. Teachers in Section 218 
States 
The second level of analysis expands upon the first by considering 
retirement income in all states in the United States. More specifically, it 
compares the mean retirement income of teachers in non-Section 218 
states to that of teachers in Section 218 states. The difference in retirement 
income between those two groups then is subtracted by the difference in 
retirement income of non-teachers in non-Section 218 states and non-
teachers in Section 218 states. This second difference, calculated from 
non-teachers in the two types of states, factors out any contemporaneous 
effects in retirement income that may be triggered by other economic or 
social characteristics of a state. 
Table 2 presents the results from the second analysis. As displayed, 
the difference-in-difference estimate shows that the annual retirement 
income of teachers in non-Section 218 states that do not participate in 
Social Security is $2,005.86 more than teachers in Section 218 states that 
participate in Social Security, after conditioning out general differences in 
retirement incomes in these two types of states.112  
                                                                                                             
 111. See supra Table 1. 
 112. See infra Table 2. 
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Table 2: Non-Section 218 and Section 218 Agreement States Mean 
Annual Retirement Income and Difference-in-Difference Estimates 
 School Teachers Non-School 
Teachers 
Non-Section 218 Agreement States 19310.16 17911.90 
 (25698.63) (29217.70) 
Number of Observations 42,217 119,666 
Section 218 Agreement States 16938.12 17545.71 
   
 (22445.59) (27697.79) 
Number of Observations 68,415 168,213 
   
Difference in Section 218 Agreement 
States 
2372.04*** 366.19*** 
 [16.14] [3.42] 
Difference-in-Difference 2005.86*** 
 [10.19] 
Data comes from the 2014 American Community Survey. Standard deviations are 
reported in parentheses. Test statistics (“t-stats”) from difference in means tests are 
reported in square brackets. * 0.10, ** 0.05 and *** 0.01 denote significance levels from 
the difference in means tests. 
 
Although the difference-in-difference estimate is lower when 
comparing all non-Section 218 states and Section 218 states instead of 
comparing just Louisiana and Alabama, the amount is still significant. At 
a minimum it indicates that Louisiana teachers—and teachers in other non-
Section 218 states—certainly have not been negatively impacted by not 
opting in to Social Security. Indeed, the estimate in Table 2 implies that 
teachers who do not participate in Social Security have more income at 
retirement than teachers who do.  
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IV. REFORM MEASURES FOR LOUISIANA AND OTHER  
NON-SECTION 218 STATES 
As a result of the Great Recession,113 nearly every state took steps to 
improve the financial condition of its pension plans.114 As one of the states 
with large and severely underfunded public pensions, Louisiana must 
continue to remedy the problem through three affirmative approaches. 
First, the existing pension plans should be modified to require the balance 
of in-flow and out-flow of funds and move toward replacement of defined 
benefit with defined contribution plans. Second, moral hazard must be 
minimized through lawmakers and taxpayers. Third, federal and local 
lawmakers need to incentivize public employees to maximize their current 
savings plans. 
A. Strategies to Modify Existing Pension Structures 
To create a more stable retirement income for public employees, 
modifications should be made to Louisiana’s existing state pension 
programs, specifically LASERS and TRSL. The state legislature and each 
pension fund board of trustees should take initiatives to bring about 
changes to current pension structures. These changes need to focus on 
restricting income increases to retirees unless there has been an increase 
of revenue to the pension funds, strengthening the reliability of the pension 
funds through defined contribution plans, and encouraging the provision 
of diverse programs for retirement savings. Although attempts have been 
made to strengthen existing pension plans, more must be done.115  
                                                                                                             
 113. The Great Recession was the longest recession since World War II, 
spanning from December 2007 to June 2009. Its duration and effects were severe. 
For example, real gross domestic product (“GDP”) fell 4.3%, the largest decline 
in the postwar era. The unemployment rate, which was five percent in December 
2007, rose until it peaked at ten percent in October 2009. Additionally, home 
prices fell approximately 30%. Robert Rich, The Great Recession of 2007-09, 
FED. RESERVE HISTORY (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.federalreservehistory.org 
/Events/DetailView/58 [https://perma.cc/C6H9-3ENB]; see also CHRISTIANO 
EICHENBAUM TRABANDT, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., No. 
1107r, UNDERSTANDING THE GREAT RECESSION (Aug. 2014), https://www.federal 
reserve.gov/econresdata/ifdp/2014/files/ifdp1107.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XAC-3 
8N6]. 
 114. See Tyler Bond, The Great Recession and Public Pensions, NAT’L PUB. 
PENSION COAL. (July 11, 2016), https://protectpensions.org/2016/07/11/great-
recession-public-pensions/ [https://perma.cc/W8YK-3V8J]. 
 115. Mark Ballard, Louisiana Legislators Want to Increase Monthly Pension 
Checks For State Retirees, ADVOCATE (Apr. 7, 2016, 4:47 PM), http://www.the 
696 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
 
 
 
1. Make Money Before Spending Money 
Louisiana’s pensions are some of the most severely underfunded in the 
country, yet Louisiana’s pensions continue to pay more money to retirees 
than pensions of other states.116 These facts indicate that the pensions are 
expending more money than what they are earning in revenue. Recent 
legislation regarding pension payouts provides an example of how this 
problem occurs. 
The Louisiana Legislature recently passed117 Senator Barrow Peacock’s 
proposed Senate Bill 2 (“Peacock’s Senate Bill”), in which pensioners over 
the age of 60 who have been retired for at least a year and are drawing checks 
from one of the four state systems would receive a 1.5% increase in 
payments for state workers and teachers; a 1.8% increase for public school 
employees; and a 2% increase for state police.118 Peacock’s bill proposed 
the first increase in benefits in two years.119 The funds to pay for this 
increase are not supposed to come from the state general fund but from the 
“Experience Account” fund, which collects excess investment dollars.120 
The money in this account legally cannot be used to pay for anything but 
Cost of Living Adjustments (“COLAs”),121 although portions are 
supposed to be used for paying down part of the billions of dollars in 
retirement system debt.122  
Although on the surface this senate bill appears to have adhered to the 
standard of only increasing payouts when there has been an increase in 
revenue, it is difficult to conclude that the money from excess investment 
                                                                                                             
advocate.com/baton_rouge/news/politics/legislature/article_aab379fd-55e1-53af-b 
a91-520757c0b3b0.html [https://perma.cc/H5LJ-LW7T]. 
 116. See SIELMAN, supra note 7. 
 117. Peacock’s Senate Bill went into effect on May 19, 2016. S.B. 2, 2016 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (La. 2016). 
 118. Id.; see also Ballard, supra note 115. 
 119. Ballard, supra note 115.  
 120. Id. 
 121. COLAs are general benefit increases given to a savings program that are 
based on increases to the cost of living, as measured by the Consumer Price Index. 
Cost-Of-Living Adjustment (COLA), SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN. (Jan. 18, 2017), https: 
//www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/colasummary.html [https://perma.cc/A54K-N2T 
P]. The Consumer Price Index is an aggregate of the prices of a relatively fixed 
“basket of goods,” which reflects price changes associated with the cost of living, 
and is published monthly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Consumer Price Index, 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATS. (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.bls.gov/cpi/ [https://per 
ma.cc/VFA9-LN8Q]. COLAs are often made to state-run pensions and to Social 
Security. Id. 
 122. Ballard, supra note 115. 
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dollars is truly revenue. The obvious concern is that because this revenue 
is not consistent—as the revenue from a tax increase would be—it is not a 
stable source of funding to justify this increase in COLAs. Further, there 
is an additional concern that in a down year in the stock market, the 
“Experience Account” will not accrue enough excess revenue to pay for 
the promised COLAs, leaving taxpayers to make up the difference.123 
Peacock’s senate bill provides just one example of how politicians 
increase payouts without first building up a base of funds to pay for 
them.124  
2. Let’s Swap: Defined Benefit for Defined Contribution 
Louisiana pension programs such as LASERS and TRSL would benefit 
from transitioning from a defined benefit to defined contribution125 structure, 
primarily because defined contribution plans have the “distinct advantage” of 
“contribution stability.”126 Defined benefit plans are vulnerable to 
contribution unpredictability because of changing market and demographic 
conditions, but defined contribution plans do not have the same sensitivity to 
market changes.127 Although the defined contribution structure at one time 
seemed to be a “radical departure from the status quo,” defined contribution 
plans have become the primary framework for retirement savings.128 
Although positive benefits exist from implementing a defined 
contribution structure, the switch from defined benefit to defined contribution 
comes with transition costs.129 Recent research shows that the type of 
                                                                                                             
 123. Id.  
 124. John C. Goodman, Detroit is a Dying Example of How All Ponzi Schemes 
End, FORBES (July 25, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johngoodman/2013 
/07/25/detroit-is-a-dying-example-of-how-all-ponzi-schemes-end/#2c93629211f0 
(describing the city of Detroit’s pension default) [https://perma.cc/LVS7-DH8E]. 
 125. A defined contribution plan is “a plan which provides for an individual 
account for each participant and for benefits based solely on the amount 
contributed to the participant’s account, and any income, expenses, gains and 
losses, and any forfeitures of accounts of other participants which may be 
allocated to such participant’s account.” I.R.C. § 414(i) (2012). 
 126. NAT’L CONF.  ON PUB.  EMP.  RET.  SYS.,  WHAT IS THE COST OF 
TRANSITIONING FROM A DB PLAN TO A DC PLAN? 9 (Apr. 2015), http://www 
.ncpers.org/files/NCPERS%20Research%20Series_2015_Transition%20Costs.p 
df [https://perma.cc/KKE5-GEZS]. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Zelinsky, supra note 41, at 453. 
 129. NAT’L CONF. ON PUB. EMP. RET. SYS., supra note 126, at 2 (“Most public 
sector employers offer both a traditional [defined benefit] plan, funded with 
employer contributions and most often employee contributions, and a [defined 
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investment returns expected after switching from a defined benefit to a 
defined contribution plan may shrink by one to two percent over the life 
of the participant.130 Although experts anticipate that this difference may 
stabilize as defined contribution participants mature and retirees invest more 
conservatively in retirement, the apparent savings from switching to a defined 
contribution plan do not come from increased investment returns and actually 
result in reduced investment returns.131 Reduced investment returns, however, 
are a small concession to make for future retirees’ pensions to be protected 
from the unpredictability of the investment markets.  
In addition to the stability that a defined contribution plan can provide for 
an employee, it allows the employee to have more autonomy over her 
retirement savings. In a culture that places a high value on private property 
and personal freedom, an individualized notion of retirement savings carries 
tremendous appeal.132 
B. Minimize Moral Hazard Through Lawmakers and Taxpayers 
People often lack the incentive to guard against risk when it comes to 
making decisions that do not affect them personally—a concept known as 
“moral hazard.”133 A clear example of the effects of this principle is 
evident in many public pension systems in which the political leaders and 
board members making decisions regarding large pensions often are not 
affected personally by the consequences of those decisions.134 Indeed, 
“[s]hort-term political manipulations” have caused long-term detriment to 
public employee retirement systems.135 Moral hazard issues typically do 
not occur in the private sector because of the absence of political risks 
                                                                                                             
contribution] plan, typically a §457 deferred compensation plan or §403(b) 
defined contribution plan funded with employee contributions.”). 
 130. Id.  
 131. Id.  
 132. Zelinsky, supra note 41, at 469. 
 133. A moral hazard is a circumstance that either creates an incentive for 
someone to act inefficiently from an economic evaluation or removes the risks 
that usually would be the consequence of inefficient acts. Moral Hazard, 
WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (Desk ed. 2012) (“The moral 
hazard of agency is present in the immunity of legal officials and poor oversight 
of corporate officials, so that neither is likely to be held accountable for their 
mistakes or misdeeds.”).  
 134. See Maria O’Brien Hylton, Combating Moral Hazard: The Case for 
Rationalizing Public Employee Benefits, 45 IND. L. REV. 413, 415–16 (2012) 
(showing statistics that fault political dimension, or moral hazard, as the 
predominant source of the public pension problem). 
 135. Anenson, supra note 15, at 35. 
2017] COMMENT 699 
 
 
 
associated with public pension.136 Remedial procedures should attempt to 
“restrain political leaders who are incentivized to supply potentially 
excessive benefits . . . that demand such benefits for their members without 
regard for whether these obligations can be met.”137 Corrective measures 
to address the issue of moral hazard should be approached through two 
major avenues: (1) promoting lawmaker responsibility; and (2) addressing 
taxpayer passivity. 
1. Promote Lawmaker Responsibility 
The first approach is to impose a duty on lawmakers to be more 
fiscally responsible. Elected officials are often criticized for spending 
“public dollars with less care than they would spend private dollars.”138 A 
common problem is that pension benefits usually are increased during 
economic boom cycles but then are not decreased during bust cycles.139 
To avoid this ratchet effect,140 Louisiana should impose modified state 
funding requirements, divert from budget provisions that promote 
underfunding, and enact prohibitions against the misuse of fund assets.141  
An example of the moral hazard problem in Louisiana is evident in 
both the responsibilities and composition of the board of trustees for 
TRSL. The board of trustees has the “full power to invest and reinvest 
available funds and to hold, purchase, sell, assign, transfer, and dispose of 
any of the . . . investments of the system.” 142 Of course, these actions are 
to be “taken in compliance with the rules,” but, interestingly, the trustees 
                                                                                                             
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 36; see also Olivia S. Mitchell & Robert S. Smith, Pension Funding 
in the Public Sector, 76 REV. ECON. & STAT. 278, 282–83 (1994). 
 139. Anenson, supra note 15, at 36; see also Hylton, supra note 134, at 421–
22. When the housing bubble formed between 2000 and 2006, there was a dramatic 
increase in property tax revenues. State and local governments had an influx in cash 
and responded to union demands by increasing employee benefits, often at decreased 
contribution levels. Id.  
 140. See ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE 
GROWTH OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1989). 
 141. Anenson, supra note 15, at 37. See generally Kathleen Paisley, Public 
Pension Funds: The Need for Federal Regulation of Trustee Investment 
Decisions, 4 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 188 (1986) (seeking federal regulation of 
trustee investment decisions); Sharon Reece et al., Regulating Public Pension 
Fund Investments: The Role of Federal Legislation, 6 BYU J. PUB. L. 101 (1992) 
(advocating federal tax policy to promote state pension funds to target certain 
kinds of investments in the state). 
 142. LA. REV. STAT. § 11:851 (2017). 
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establish the rules.143 Board members establish the regulations in 
accordance with the provision of Louisiana Revised Statutes § 11:263.144 
Each fiduciary or trustee running the financial operations of the system are 
held to a “prudent-man” standard, that is, he must “act with the care, skill, 
prudence, . . . diligence[,] . . . [and] reasonable care” of a prudent 
institutional investor under the circumstances.145 
Although TRSL is governed by strict and specific rules through 
legislation, it is curious that the board of trustees, which governs TRSL’s 
financial decisions, is made up of 17 people, a third of whom are not 
members of the pension program.146 Thus, although this one-third has a 
large portion of the votes, their retirement funds are not affected personally 
by the consequences of their votes. Because high-ranking officials in both 
the education and government systems comprise the one-third group,147 
they likely have unequal bargaining power when it comes to decisions 
regarding TRSL’s pension funds.  
2. Address Taxpayer Passivity 
The second approach requires employers, pension boards, and the 
legislature to target taxpayers’ passivity.148 This step is crucial to “make the 
financial effects of pension reform more salient.”149 To encourage public 
response, politicians must “inform and enable” taxpayers to participate in 
the running of public pensions.150 Taxpayer involvement can be 
accomplished through three mechanisms.  
                                                                                                             
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. § 11:263(B)–(C). Ironically enough, the legislature has provided a 
mechanism to deal with any excess funds in the instance of the system absolving. 
“[I]f the system shall be terminated and all obligations under the system are fully 
funded and provided for, then any excess funds held by the system shall be 
returned to the employer.” Id. § 11:856. 
 146. The board of trustees for “TRSL” is made up of 17 people, 12 of whom 
are voting members of the program; the other five are not members. Id. § 11:822. 
 147. The state superintendent of education, the state treasurer, the commissioner 
of administration, a member of the House Committee on Retirement appointed by 
the speaker of the House of Representatives, and the chairman of the Retirement 
Committee of the Senate of the Louisiana Legislature. § 11:822(A)(1)–(6). 
 148. Anenson, supra note 15, at 42. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. See Hylton, supra note 134, at 471–72 (recommending reforms that 
“encourage taxpayers to function like shareholders and others with a serious stake 
in the financial health of a private enterprise”). 
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First, the public needs to understand and appreciate the magnitude of state 
public pension liabilities.151 Louisiana voters likely will be more critical of 
policy changes if fully informed of the dire situation of their own pensions. 
Due to taxpayer disinterest, many of the problems with public pensions have 
gone unnoticed through the last several decades, and only recently has 
scholarly interest ignited discussion of the topic.152 Research shows that 
academic interest in public pension liabilities is a recent phenomenon and 
usually corresponds with financial obstacles suffered in various economies.153 
Because pension policy changes have long-term effects, taxpayers should 
show constant concern, not just during an economic downturn. 
Second, the lack of uniformity in the pension systems has “further 
complicate[d] comparisons of reported information among public pension 
systems.”154 Inconsistent reporting comes as a result of different assumptions 
about what determines liabilities, which confuse the reported information that 
is dispersed to the public.155 Assumptions that are inconsistently reported 
include demographics, assumed rates of return on investments, other 
economic indicators, and information about the plan.156 One of the solutions 
to disjointed reporting procedures is for Louisiana to consolidate its systems 
for purposes of reporting or disclose data separately for each system within 
the state. Implementing the uniform criteria for reporting within and between 
states would permit a complete and transparent evaluation of each system.157 
Third, the board of trustees for each pension system, as well as the 
governmental entities involved, must be held to a higher standard for 
accurate reporting.158 In many states, the reporting methods understate 
                                                                                                             
 151. Anenson, supra note 15, at 42. 
 152. Stephen P. D’Arcy et al., Optimal Funding of State Employee Pension 
Systems, 66 J. RISK & INS. 345, 347 (1999) (comparing the volume of research 
done on private pension funding with the lack of research on state pension 
funding). 
 153. Id.  
 154. Anenson, supra note 15, at 44. 
 155. Mitchell & Smith, supra note 138, at 288 (discussing various methods 
used by actuaries to determine pension plan liabilities). 
 156. Anenson, supra note 15, at 44. See generally NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, NEA 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND MEMBER ADVOCACY, CHARACTERISTICS OF LARGE 
PUBLIC EDUCATION PENSION PLANS 93 (2016), https://www.nea.org/assets/docs/HE 
/CharacteristicsLargePubEdPensionPlans2016.pdf [https://perma .cc/LUD8-MT8T]. 
 157. Anenson, supra note 15, at 44. So far, only Wyoming and Maryland have 
adopted the substance of the uniform law. Id. at 46. More states should consider 
enacting a uniform law to ensure clear and complete information to those 
monitoring the system and to create political incentives for leaders who address 
pension difficulties.  
 158. Anenson, supra note 15, at 46. 
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taxpayer liability, and the magnitude of fiscal stress is misrepresented.159 The 
lower the reporting, the lower the apparent amount of contributions that are 
owed to the plans, thus creating the appearance that excess funds exist that 
can be used elsewhere.160 These misrepresentations of the extent of fiscal 
stress are frequently credited as contributing to the imminent demise of many 
public pension plans.161 Implementing these mechanisms to reduce taxpayer 
passivity will lead to an increased demand in legislative responsibility and 
therefore an increase in pension stability. 
 C. Incentivize Public Employees to Maximize Current Contributions 
Because of the unstable nature of public pensions, “[w]orkers today 
must save to gain a secure retirement.”162 Researchers recently examined 
the existing options that provide encouragement for future retirees to take 
more ownership of their retirement.163 One option offered by the federal 
government provides traditional incentives for saving through favorable 
tax treatment for employer plans and IRAs.164 Although the IRA incentive 
involves a substantial loss of government revenue, the growth of IRA 
program use has had a significant impact on retirement savings.165 With 
the rising popularity of the IRA program, there is ongoing debate about 
whether the use of this savings program is actually because of the 
government tax incentive.166 
                                                                                                             
 159. Id. 
 160. See generally J. Fred Giertz & Leslie E. Papke, Public Pension Plans: 
Myths and Realities for State Budgets, 60 NAT. TAX J. 305, 305–23 (2007) 
(finding evidence that assumptions are manipulated in order to lower the 
necessary contributions to pension plans). 
 161. Id. 
 162. STEVEN A. SASS, CTR. FOR RET. RES. AT B.C., NO. 16-15, CAN WE 
INCREASE RETIREMENT SAVING? 1 (Sept. 2016), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/up 
loads/2016/08/IB_16-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/5B8W-FSZQ]. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Individual Retirement Account, WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW 
DICTIONARY (Desk ed. 2012).  
 165. SASS, supra note 162, at 2. “The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates 
the cost in foregone revenue for 401(k)s and IRAs at $110 billion in 2015. These 
plans hold a tremendous amount of retirement savings–$13.6 trillion at the end of 
2015.” Id.  
 166. Id. Some research supports the claim that small changes in tax incentives 
have little effect on the saving of high-income workers, who are the workers 
getting the largest financial benefit from the favorable tax treatment of retirement 
saving. Id.  
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Further, there is conclusive research affirming that behavior incentives, 
as opposed to tax incentives, can increase retirement savings significantly 
on an individual level.167 Congress encouraged the use of behavioral 
initiatives by passing the Pension Protection Act (“PPA”) of 2006.168 
Congress enacted the PPA primarily because, although individuals were 
saving, they often were not saving enough to maximize the potential of their 
investments by receiving the entire employer match.169 The PPA attempted 
to remedy this problem by creating incentives for employers to set up 
automatic enrollment arrangements with automatic escalation features; 
expanding tax benefits for low- and moderate-income households by 
making the “saver’s credit”170 permanent and indexing it for inflation; and 
allowing individuals to have their directly deposited federal income tax 
refunds split among as many as three different accounts to eliminate 
temptation to spend the funds.171  
A decade later, research shows that the automatic escalation feature 
alone has increased overall 401(k) accumulations, particularly for low to 
moderate-income groups.172 Although these tools sometimes are associated 
with a reduction in employee contributions and employer match rates,173 the 
                                                                                                             
 167. Id. at 5. 
 168. Ericca Maas, Aim of Pension Protection Act is to Increase Personal 
Retirement Savings, FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS (May 1, 2007), 
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/community-dividend/aim-of-pension- 
protection-act-is-to-increase-personal-retirement-savings [https://perma.cc/78K9-F7 
K6]. 
 169. Id. 
 170. The “[s]aver’s [c]redit” is known formally as the Retirement Savings 
Contribution Credit. Codified in Internal Revenue Code § 25B, this credit can be 
applied against the total amount of taxes owed by a taxpayer. The credit is 
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contributions to qualified retirement and 403(b) plans. Retirement Savings 
Contribution Credit, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.irs 
.gov/retirement-plans/plan-participant-employee/retirement-savings-contributions- 
savers-credit [https://perma.cc/8PQH-D2VN]. 
 171. Maas, supra note 168. 
 172. Robert Powell, Time for a Pension Protection Act of 2016/17, 
MARKETWATCH (Aug. 25, 2016), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/time-for-a-
pension-protection-act-of-201617-2016-08-25 [https://perma.cc/4STB-NQFD]. 
 173. SASS, supra note 162, at 5. 
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conclusive report on the effects of behavioral incentives shows that 
behavior interventions can increase retirement savings significantly.174 
Several solutions exist that, if taken together, can address the deeply 
rooted issues in public pension systems across the nation. Requiring 
existing pensions to have balanced accounts and replacing defined benefit 
with defined contribution plans will help stabilize funds. Encouraging 
lawmakers to avoid moral hazard and increasing taxpayer awareness will 
spurn thoughtful resolutions and informed voting. Lastly, providing 
incentives for public employees to maximize their current savings plans 
will help them more thoroughly prepare for retirement. By implementing 
these affirmative approaches, Louisiana could strengthen its struggling 
pension programs and provide a secure future for its retirees. 
CONCLUSION 
Louisiana’s pension systems, particularly LASERS and TRSL, are 
severely underfunded because of overspending and a shortage of revenue. 
There are several suggested approaches for dealing with this 
underfunding. First, and most importantly, the state should reject the notion 
that public employees—particularly teachers—should opt into Social 
Security through a Section 218 Agreement. Second, current defined benefit 
plans should transition to a defined contribution structure, shifting the risk 
and responsibility of investment to the employee. Third, lawmakers and 
pensions boards must refrain from engaging in moral hazard issues that can 
lead to irresponsible decisions regarding pension funds. Finally, more 
incentives should be given to employees to have greater autonomy over 
their own pension plans, either through governmental tax benefits or 
employer-created pension contributions. Implementing these structures 
will provide stability to suffering pension programs in Louisiana, offering 
overall economic stability to the state. 
 
Alyssa Depew 
                                                                                                             
 174. Id. 
  J.D./D.C.L., 2018, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University. 
The author would like to thank Elizabeth Carter, Dustin Cooper, and Heidi Thompson 
for their thoughtful edits and feedback. A special thanks to Briggs Depew for his 
invaluable comments and support.  
 
